Utah v. Daniel Cruz Perez : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Utah v. Daniel Cruz Perez : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight, Esplin; attorney for appellee.
Scott Keith Wilson; assistant attorney general; Jan Graham; attorney general; Phillip W. Hadfield;
Deputy Utah County Attorney; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Perez, No. 990470 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2190
IN THE UTAH COURT OF AfHALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Case Nk.fl50470-CA 
vs. 
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ 
PrforitsM'- 2 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLAf| 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT'S j RANT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AND DISMISSAL OF A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY CHARGE OF DAMAGING A JAIL, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH 
HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN, PRESf 
118 (1996), IN THE 
fNTY, THE 
G. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603 




300 South, 6th Floor 
City, Utah 84114 
e: (801) 366-0180 
IP W. HADFIELD 
iwUtah County Attorney 
A t t
° m i s f° r Appdi j i *~i*pm$ft 
Attorney for Appellee Julia D'Aiesanoi 
GSerkoftheGot 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 990470-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AND DISMISSAL OF A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY CHARGE OF DAMAGING A JAIL, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-418 (1996), IN THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN, PRESIDING. 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603 
PHILLIP W. HADFIELD 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OFTHE ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE IS UNAMBIGUOUS 
AND INCLUDES ANY DAMAGE TO A JAIL; NO FURTHER 
INTERPRETIVE RULE NEED BE APPLIED TO CONSTRUE 
THE LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE, AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY CONFIRMS THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A BROAD 
READING OF ITS TERMS 4 
A. The statute is unambiguous and its plain meaning provides 
for broad application to "any damage" done to a jail facility. . 4 
B. The doctrines of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis need 
not be used to interpret me unambiguous language in this 
statute 7 




ADDENDUM A - Utah Revised Statutes, Penal Code § 4433 (1898) 
ADDENDUM B - California Penal Code § 4600 (West 1996) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
SI All ( ASI S 
DetathI v Uuihih (\wit\>, 'MS P \l 17,.! 11 Hull App I')')/) . . . . . 9 
State v. Ash, 493 P.2d 701 (Idaho 1971) , -2 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995)' 1 
State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d Ml (Utah App. 1991) . 4, 5 
State v. Mathews, 633 P.2d IllW (AM/HIM 1981) 7 
5tofc v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993) . • .o 
State v. Vog/, 824 P.2d 4i5 (Utah App. 1991) , 
DOCKETED CASES 
State v / /u , . . , i p o p ^ t IK I / l'W»>i . . . 1 
. I I'lH ( V I S I O N S S I U I I | S \ M ) Kl I I ^ 
Cai. Penal Code § 4b(ju
 v,»est 1996) 11 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-418(1996) . . ' ~ • 
Utah Code Ann 5 7 7 1 0 " 1 (Supp. 1998) 1 
Utah C ode Ann < /IS 2>i I I 19%) 1 
UtahKrvised Shinies Pi nil Cod s Mil (1X98) III 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 990470-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ, 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's grant of defendant's motion to quash 
and dismissal of a third degree felony charge of damaging a jail, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1996). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) and § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether defendant's conduct alleged in this case, scratching an obscenity into 
the paint of a door in a jail cell, constitutes damage to a jail as prohibited by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-418. This question of the interpretation of the terms of a statute is an issue 
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Harley, slip op at 3 (June 17, 1999); State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1996): 
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, 
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of 
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 19, 1998, defendant was charged with one count of damaging a 
jail, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (R.4). At the preliminary hearing, 
defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 17) 
(hereinafter, "Prelim"), which the magistrate denied, and defendant was bound over 
(R.72). Defendant then filed a motion in District Court to quash the bindover and 
dismiss the charge (R.85). On April 13, 1999, the district judge granted defendant's 
motion (R.103), and the State now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 25, 1998, defendant was arrested and brought into the Utah County 
Jail (Prelim, p. 6). Defendant was put in a holding cell because of his failure to 
cooperate with the booking process (Prelim, p. 6). Defendant continued to be verbally 
abusive after being placed in the cell, yelling and banging on the door of the cell with 
his hands (Prelim, p. 7). After defendant calmed down, he was removed from the cell. 
Defendant came out holding up two keys and a penny (Prelim, p. 13), and kept saying 
"I'm sorry, I'm sorry" (Prelim, p. 7). After defendant was removed from the cell, the 
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booking officer found that the word "fuck" had been scratched into the back door of 
the cell in letters approximately 4-6 inches in height (Prelim, p. 8). 
In order to repair the damage done to the cell, two painters came in and painted 
over the door with a special epoxy base paint, waited a number of hours, and then 
applied another coat of the paint (Prelim, p. 12). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The 'damaging jails' statute punishes anyone who "breaks down, pulls down, 
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail. . . ." The language of this 
statute by its terms broadly applies to any damage done to a jail facility, and the statute 
nowhere implies that a high degree of damage is a minimum threshold before the 
statute applies. The two Utah cases considering the scope of the statute found that the 
plain language of the statute must be given effect to broadly cover "any" damage done 
to a jail. Since the plain language of the statute is not ambiguous, in that it does not 
render the statute either inoperable or confusing, no further interpretive doctrines need 
be applied to ascertain the proper scope of the statute. Further, the legislative history 
of this statute shows that it was intended to cover any damage done to a jail facility, 
without regard to the cost of repairs or to the level of inconvenience or danger caused 




THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
INCLUDES ANY DAMAGE TO A JAIL; NO FURTHER 
INTERPRETIVE RULE NEED BE APPLIED TO CONSTRUE THE 
LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE, AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY CONFIRMS THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A BROAD 
READING OF ITS TERMS. 
A. The statute is unambiguous and its plain meaning provides for broad 
application to "any damage" done to a jail facility. 
The damaging jails statute at issue in this case provides as follows: 
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, 
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of 
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1996) (emphasis added). The trial court held that the 
phrase "otherwise damages" must be limited to include only damage which is "of a 
similar nature and comparable gravity" to the other harms listed in the statute, and 
found that the damage alleged in this case were not within the scope of the statute 
(R. 101). However, the language of this statute has been twice considered by this 
Court, and in both cases, its broad application to any act of damaging a jail facility has 
been acknowledged. 
In State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1991), the court considered a 
defendant's argument that a lesser included instruction on the crime of criminal 
mischief should have been given. The court assumed (and the state conceded) that the 
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crime of criminal mischief was, in fact, a lesser included offense to the crime of 
damaging jails because the criminal mischief statute and the damaging jails statutes both 
encompass "any" injury to property to the property of another. The request for a lesser 
included instruction on criminal mischief was rejected, however, because there was no 
rational basis for acquitting defendant of the damaging a jail charge and still convicting 
defendant of criminal mischief. "[A]ny damage to the facility amounted to an injury. 
And, as we have already discussed, the area damaged was the jail. Therefore, there is 
no interpretation of the evidence that would rationally allow for acquittal of injury to a 
jail and, at the same time, allow for a conviction of criminal mischief." Jaimez, 817 
P.2d at 827. Thus, the scope of these two statutes, in terms of the degree of damage, 
are the same. Any damage to property is punishable under either statute, and the only 
difference between the scope of the statutes is the type of property which is damaged. 
State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993) affirms this broad 
interpretation of the scope of the statute. In Pharris, defendant made the same claim 
that defendant makes in this case, that the damaging jails statute only refers to 
"substantial damage," and that its application to the relatively minor damage caused in 
that case (breaking of a bunk weld and damage to an automatic clock on a back-up 
generator in the basement) constituted a denial of due process, since defendant had no 
notice that such minor damage would violate the damaging jails statute. In rejecting 
this argument, the court observed that "as recognized in Jaimez, the statutory language 
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includes 'any damage to the facility' within the plain meaning of 'injury.'" Pharris, 
846 P.2d at 466. The court thus rejected defendant's claim that the damaging jails 
statute only refers to substantial damage because the broad language of the statute must 
be accepted as written. "This broad interpretation of the word 'injury' negates 
defendant's claim that the statute failed to give him fair warning that his actions could 
result in a felony conviction." Id. 
Of course, one may quibble about the relative seriousness of the damage or the 
relative costs of the repairs caused under the specific facts of Jaimez, Pharris, or this 
case. However, such an inquiry into whether it is more costly or dangerous to repair a 
bunk bracket, as in Pharris, or repaint a cell door, as in this case, is irrelevant. The 
court's rulings in Jaimez and Pharris were not based upon some calculation as to the 
relative seriousness of the particular damage done in those cases. Instead, these 
decisions are based on the court's basic finding that, by its plain language, the 
damaging jails statute applies to all damage, of whatever degree. 
This valuation concept is immaterial in the context of protecting the 
functioning of a jail. While costly damage could have minimal impact 
on the safe functioning of the facility, minimal damage to critical parts of 
the physical facilities could have disastrous consequences. For this 
reason, we conclude that protecting each essential part of the facility 
without regard to the cost of repairing it is rationally related to the goal of 
inmate and public safety. 
Pharris, 846 P.2d at 468 (emphasis added). There is no evidence in record as to how 
much it cost to repair the cell door damaged by defendant in this case, or regarding the 
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degree of disruption to the operation of the jail and danger to others caused by the fact 
that this cell was unusable for some period of time during the repairs. Such evidence is 
irrelevant because the statute does not require the state to prove that some minimum of 
cost, danger, or disruption to jail operations has occurred in order for the statute to 
have been violated. 
Two other states with damaging jails statutes have also broadly interpreted the 
scope of the same language used in the Utah statute. In State v. Ash, 493 P.2d 701 
(Idaho 1971), the court considered the scope of the Idaho statute prohibiting damage to 
a jail as a felony, which is essentially identical to the Utah statute, and held that it 
applied to a broken window. Id., 493 P.2d at 705. In State v. Mathews, 633 P.2d 
1039 (Arizona 1981), the court ruled that the Arizona statute, which is also identical to 
the Utah statute, applied to defendant's jamming of a lock by "bottling the mechanism 
with toilet paper." Id., 633 P.2d at 1041. 
B. The doctrines of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis need not be used to 
- interpret the unambiguous language in this statute. 
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argued that the doctrines of noscitur a sociis 
("it is known from its associates") and ejusdem generis ("of the same kind") should be 
applied to this statute in order to determine its intended meaning. These related 
principles provide that "when general terms follow specific ones, the general terms 
must be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense analogous to the preceding specific 
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terms." State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah App. 1991). In its Ruling dismissing 
the charge in this case, the trial court found that "the 'otherwise damages' language in 
the statute must be restricted to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity to 
the behavior defined in the statute." R.lOl. The court's application of this interpretive 
doctrine is not appropriate in light of the unambiguous language of the statute.1 
A court may resort to such canons of statutory interpretation as noscitur a sociis 
or ejusdem generis only if it first makes a finding that the plain language of the statute 
is ambiguous in some way: 
When we construe a statute, we first explore its plain language and use 
other modes of interpretation only if the language contains ambiguities. 
Unless a literal reading would render the statute's wording unreasonably 
inoperable or confusing, we accord the wording its " 'usual and accepted 
1
 The trial court's ruling also states that "[c]ourts must apply a case-by-case 
approach to determine whether any injury to a jail constitutes 'damage' under the 
statute," citing Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466. However, Pharris does not require such 
case-by-case determination of the relative seriousness of the damage caused. Indeed, 
there was no evidence in Pharris as to the cost of the repairs or the level of disruption 
caused, and, as noted above, Pharris expressly disclaimed the need for any such case-
by-case assessment. Id. at 468. In concluding that Pharris dictates a case-by-case 
evaluation of the nature of the damages caused, the trial court apparently relied on the 
Pharris court's refusal to consider the defendant's argument that the statute was void-
for-vagueness on its face because of the court's finding that the statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the undisputably physical damage alleged in that 
case. Id. at 466. Thus, although some theoretical application of the statute to harm to 
or disruption of the facility that is non-physical in nature may be unconstitutional 
(because there are no meaningful standards to apply in such a case), where an actual 
physical injury of some sort is alleged, there is no vagueness problem. "The statute 
sets the standard that any injury to a physical facility used for jail functions can be 
punished under the statute." Id. 
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meaning*" and do not "'look beyond plain and unambiguous language to 
•/ ascertain legislative intent.'* We merely assume the Legislature carefully 
and advisedly chose the statute's words and phrases, 
j 1Q97^  (quoting Gull 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah App. 1997; anu LS 
Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1 I T a :tah A I T i~04V '"he 
plain language of this statute, which applies to anyone who "breaks down p-Us ;! *rri 
destroys, floods, \n ulhcrwisc damages a nail is clear on .. : 
"inoperable" tun nHifus (titt'l'i fittinc mid IVnim\ inliTfHrfn) the st.itiili1 
according to this am meaning. See Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466 n. 10 ("[Jaimez] 
construed the 'injury LJ ^J-U. bUiimc according to the fair im^rr oi \^ v{ -^ s 
required by Utah Code Annotated sectior T- * 106 rooo>.2 and interpreted :t according 
to the mlc ot tonsil *. *i. ,, :.. u^;.^ • neaning. 
Siiiee Jama . •
 r ' < * 
amendment did not alter the substance of the language and ib nieaivr^ ;s ami ^caA JU 
Its face. In 1996, the phrase 44or otherwise destroys or injures any public jail " was 
2
 This code section provides as follows: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to 
this code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this 
state. All provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this 
state shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to 
promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes 
of Section 76-1-104 
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substituted with the even less ambiguous phrase "or otherwise damages any public jail. 
. ." The plain meaning of these phrases is the same, and is on its face not limited to 
any particular type or degree of damage. See Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466 ("As 
recognized in Jaimez, the statutory language includes 'any damage to the facility' 
within the plain meaning of 'injury'"). There is simply no ambiguity in this statute 
which would require the court to consider anything other than its plain language. See 
Vogt, 824 P.2d at 458 (finding that noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis should be 
applied to construe the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "any other act of gross 
lewdness").3 
C. Legislative history supports a broad reading of the statute. 
The 'damaging jails' statute was originally derived from a California Penal Code 
section, and remained essentially unchanged from its adoption in 1898 until it was 
amended in 1996. See Utah Revised Statutes, Penal Code § 4433 (1898) (Addendum 
3
 Even if the court were apply noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis and consider 
the other terms of the statute in order to construe the meaning of "otherwise damages," 
these doctrines would not dictate a more limited reading of the statute. If the scope of 
the statute was construed to be limited to the types of harm implied by the words 
"breaks down, pulls down, destroys, [or] floods," there are two options. First, these 
terms could be read with a limited scope, meaning an almost complete destruction of 
the jail structure. However, as Jaimez and Pharris show, that is not the intent of the 
statute. Second, these vague terms could be construed more broadly; e.g., "breaks 
down" could mean to break down some piece or part of the jail. If this is true, there is 
no logical reason to limit the application of the terms to breaking down some 
unspecified "significant" part of the jail. 
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1). The fact that the original statutory language from the Galifonua Penal Code was 
intended to cover all damage to a jail, no matter how minor, is made clear by later 
amend* i 
;IIII IPU eption 1111 li lii.idf" <I;im;ipes worth less than $2004 a misdemeanor. Cal. Penal 
Code § 4600 (West 1996) (Addendum 1). The implication is i^t, without ihe later 
exception, the original language, as adopted in r ^ 1 " ' :^ ed ?]] damage to a jai1 
'Ihe later amendmen* *° ne Utah statute also confir ;.>> uuiau.j 
• * ( > K 4 ! K \ A 
for 
Every A person v» L- willfully and intentionally breaks d^*n, pulls d. \K\\9 
destroys, floods, or otherwise destroys or injures damages any public jail 
or othei
 i;;-iace of confinement is guilty < A a felony of the third degree. 
See Utah Codv Ann. AiuCi^hiciit Notes. Tn ^roposi.ig iin^ amendment iw A. .eeie 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. House Bill 44 came to me from some of .>...,; 
county attorneys who've been having problems with inmates, who are 
state inmates they were holding in the county facilities, who w ere taking 
their towels and shirts and sheets and other things and putting them 
in the toilets until they flooded the jail. Current statute says a person 
who willfully or intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, injures 
any other public jail or place of confinement is guilty of a felony of third 
degree. But flooding is not in there, this simply adds the word - adds 
flooding to that in both adult and juvenile facilities. Thank you I 
appreciate your support. 
' I his J i i i i< n u it: i. is 'o $400 in 1983. 
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February 13, 1996 House AM Tape 1 at 804 (emphasis added) {see Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R.50). Accordingly, the word 
"floods" was added in order to address the problem of inmates making their toilets 
overflow, causing minor flooding which presumably did not cause any physical damage 
to the jail other than the necessity for cleanup. If physical damage to a jail caused by 
more extensive flooding were being addressed, there would be no need for an 
amendment, as Jaimez and Pharris, which both addressed flooding which caused some 
actual physical damage, make clear. By adding a provision which covers the relatively 
minor problem of overflowing toilets, and which does not even require the existence of 
physical harm to the jail, the legislature made clear its intent that any damage to a jail is 
meant to be covered by the statute. See Ash, 493 P.2d at 705 ("The legislature has 
concluded that damaging a jail is a more serious criminal act than damaging other real 
or personal property"). 
12 
CONCLUSI C »I i 
. • p o r bindover and dismissal of 
'the charge should be reversed and the case remanded for fiirther proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 1 day of September, 1999. 
JAIN U K A l i A M 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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OF ' THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
IN FORCE 
JA - 1898 
Bivi ' ihd, Amiulul 
in i "'I" 
RICHARD W. YOUNG, 
GRANT H. SMITH, 
WILLIAM A. LEE, 
Code Commissioners. 
TOGETHER "W IT'II THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, THE ENABLING ACT, ANH 
THE NATURALIZATION LAWS 
934 PENAL CODE. 
*. Maliciously cuts down or removes any tree upon which any such 
been made for such purpose, with intent to destroy such marks * ^ ^ 
3 
have 
of a misdemeanor. fC. L. § 4712* 
Cal. Pen. C. § 605*. U. S. monuments, e tc , £ 4438 3% 
4433. Injuring or d e s t r o y i n g j a i l . Every person who wilful! 
intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or otherwise destroys or injure* 
public jail or other place of confinement, is guilty of a felony. [C. L. § 4— ^ 
Cal. Pen. C. i 606*. +3&C 
4434. Injuring or destroying canal, reservoir, etc. Every -*"'*
 % 
who wilfully and maliciously cuts, breaks, injures, or destroys any bridge* * ^ 
canal, flume, aqueduct, levee, embankment, leservoir, or other structure erf, < t 
to create hydraulic power, or to drain or reclaim any swamp and overflowed 3 
marsh land, or to conduct water for mining, manufacturing, reclamation, or 4 •*' 
cultural purposes, or for the supply of the inhabitants of any city or tows*** 
any embankment necessary to the same, or either of them; or w ilf ully or m 
ciously makes or causes to be made, any apertuie in such dam, canal, flui. 
aqueduct, reservoir, embankment, levee, or structure, with intent to i n i u r ^ 
destroy the same; or draws up, cuts, or injures any piles fixed in the g r o u n d s 
used for securing any lake or river bank or walls, or any dock, quay, jetty -
lock, is punishable by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisons;^ 
in the state prison not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment 
[C. L. § 4714*. * y£ 
Cal. Pen C \ 007*. 
Interfering \wth water f uictt, etc
 t % 4448, 4449 Interference with 01 I irtetn of \sater, 33 4372. 
4435. Burning or d e s t r o y i n g l u m b e r , e tc . B o a t s . Every perl: 
who wilfully and maliciously burns, injures, or destroys any pile or raft of wc 
plank, boards, or other lumber, or any part theieof, or cuts loose or setsadu 
any such raft or any part thereof, or cuts, breaks, injures, sinks, or sets adrift °* 
vessel, boat, or skiff, the property of another, is punishable by a fine in any sn: 
less than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not excecc 
ing six months. [C. L. § 4715. 
Cal Pen. C. ? 608* Burning property not the subject of arson, { 4 t 
4436. I n j u r i n g or de fac ing U. S. m o n u m e n t s , e tc . Every per<~ 
who wilfully injures, defaces, or removes any signal, monument, building, 
appurtenance thereto, placed, erected, or used by persons engaged in the Unite 
States or state survey, is guilty of a misdemeanor. [C. L. § 4716*. / 
Cal Pen C ? 615"5. RcmoMiig or defacing other monuments, J 44S 
4437. Injuring o r d e s t r o y i n g t o l l - h o u s e o r g a t e . Every person wl 
maliciously injures or destroys any toil-house or turnpike gate, is guilty of 
misdemeanor. [C. L. § 4702. " J^g 
Cal. Pen. C. \ 589. 
4 4 3 8 . R e m o v i n g or injuring mi le post , etc. Every person wt 
maliciously removes or injures any mile board, post, or stone, or guide post, 1 
any inscription on such, erected upon any highway, is guilty of a misdemeano 
[C. L. § 4703. 
Cal. Pen. C i 590. 
4439. Defacing or destroying official notice or proclamatio: 
Every person who intentionally defaces, obliterates, tears down, or destroys ai 
copy or transcript, or extract from, or of, any law of the United Statea, or of tc 
state, or any proclamation, advertisement, or notification set up at any place 
this state, by authority of an)'' law of the United States or of this state, or 1 
order of any court or of any public officer, before the expiration of the time 1 
which the same was to remain set up, is punishable by fine not less than twen 
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§ 4600. Punishment; restitution 
(a) Every person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or otherwise destroys or injures any jail, 
prison, or any public property in any jail or prison, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000), 
and by imprisonment in the state prison, except that where the damage or injury to any city, city and county, or county 
jail property or prison property is determined to be four hundred dollars ($400) or less, that person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
(b) In any case in which a person is convicted of violating this section, the court may order the defendant to make 
restitution to the public entity that owns the property damaged by the defendant. The court shall specify in the order 
that the public entity that owns the property damaged by the defendant shall not enforce the order until the defendant 
satisfies all outstanding fines, penalties, assessments, restitution fines, and restitution orders. 
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5157, § 293.5, operative July 1, 1977; Stats.1978, c. 1186, p. 3837, § 2; Stats.1979, c. 255, p. 562, § 31.) 
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(Amended by Stats.1983, c. 1092, § 325, eff. Sept. 27, 1983, operative Jan. 1, 1984; Stats.1996, c. 803 (A.B.573), § 
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HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
1999 Electronic Update 
1983 Amendment. Substituted "four hundred dollars ($400)" for "two hundred dollars ($200)". 
1996 Legislation 
The 1996 amendment designated the existing section as subd. (a) and added subd. (b) relating to restitution. 
1982 Main Volume 
The 1957 amendment added the exception at the end of the section. 
The 1976 amendment deleted "not exceeding five years" following "in the state prison." 
The 1978 amendment inserted "any public property in any jail or prison" and deleted "a" before "fine". 
The 1979 amendment included as a misdemeanor damage to "prison property" of $200 or less. 
Derivation: Pen.C. § 606, amended by Stats. 1941, c. 106, p. 1082, § 9. 
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